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ABSTRACT The opportunities social media provide for agential expressions of subjectivity and
experiential learning, relative to social media’s role in reproducing digital-era capitalism, are the subject
of keen debate. There is now a burgeoning academic literature which suggests that social media users
are, to a greater or lesser degree, alienated by the activities of mega-corporations like Google and
Facebook. Within this literature two broad perspectives are clearly identifiable. The first insists that
social media platforms strongly alienate their users. To the extent that critical media scholars who
advance this proposition are preoccupied with ideological hegemony, their work emblematises the
idealist tendency of (old) media theorists that Dallas W. Smythe criticises. Contributors to the second
perspective posit a trade-off between social media user alienation and exploitation. Not only is this idea
inherently problematical, it does not go far enough towards resetting the analysis of social media back
onto a materialist track. This article seeks to do just that.

Frequently, Marxists and those radical social critics who use Marxist terminology locate the
significance of mass communications systems in their capacity to produce ‘ideology’ which is
held to act as a sort of invisible glue that holds together the capitalist system ... . But for Marxists,
such an explanatory notion should be unsatisfactory. The first question that historical
materialists should ask about mass communications is what economic function for capital do
they serve, attempting to understand their role in the reproduction of capitalist relations of
production. (Dallas W. Smythe, 1977, p. 1)

Introduction
Coined by authors of various disciplinary and political stripes, a suite of terms signals a
comparatively recent technologically wrought change in capitalism. Here are just a few:
technocapitalism (Suarez-Villa, 2009); semiocapitalism (Berardi, 2011); cybernetic capitalism (Peters
et al, 2009); and informational capitalism (Castells, 2000). Web 2.0 is a key driver of this capitalist
reconfiguration. In the neo-liberal interpretation, distanciated Internet users operate within an
economy of free-flowing and non-hierarchical commons-based peer production (Benkler, 2006).
Yet this cooperative, reciprocity-based system is ever-more subject to corporate dictates as Internet
media behemoths structure the online environment and the way people interact with, and within,
the web. Sounding a note of warning, Vaidhyanathan (2011) calls this process ‘googlization’.
Google’s mantra, of course, is that its services are free. Indeed, it is arguably the triumphal
‘flagbearer of Free’ (Anderson, 2009, p. 120). The irony is that Google’s social media platforms,
notably YouTube but also Google+, draw on time and effort supplied by unpaid users. Refracting
Marx through the autonomist social factory lens, and employing the notion of value-creating
labour extending well beyond the wage-relation (Terranova, 2000), it is then but a short step to say
that social media users are therefore alienated or even exploited (Andrejevic, 2009; Fuchs, 2010;
Fisher, 2012; Rey, 2012).
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The authors cited immediately above extend the critique of social media beyond the notion
that ‘learning to immaterial labour 2.0’ through social media creates new networked forms of
subjectivity which function to reproduce digital capitalism’s social relations (Coté & Pybus, 2011).
If these authors are correct, systematic estrangement and value extraction operate in parallel with
this learning process. Yet conceptual imprecision abounds amongst this new crop of ‘radical social
critics’ (to paraphrase Smythe) who ‘use Marxist terminology’ in an effort to understand the effects
of social media usage. Mark Andrejevic claims that YouTube users’ ‘alienation’ is itself ‘evidence of
exploitation’ (Andrejevic, 2009, p. 421). By contrast, P.J. Rey argues that social media is ‘an industry
on the web where exploitation can occur with minimal alienation’ (Rey, 2012, p. 416). Eran Fisher
puts it even more starkly strategic terms: ‘in order for Facebook to exploit the work of its users, it
must contribute to their de-alienation’ (Fisher, 2012, p. 171). This is the iceberg’s tip: in the wider
social media literature, alienation and exploitation are often used uncritically and interchangeably.
To date, no one has systematically evaluated how critical communication scholars apply these
concepts to social media. Focusing on alienation in particular, this article provides just such a
review.
First I draw out the different meanings of alienation in Marx’s own work, and identify his
latter-day interpreters’ tendency to accentuate subjective rather than objective – economic –
alienation. Then I identify two distinct lines of thought within critical social media studies that
feature alienation as a central theme. One is preoccupied with ideological hegemony and thus
emblematises the idealist tendency of (old) media theorists that Smythe (1977) criticises. The other
position sophistically brackets alienation in a trade-off with exploitation; authors who write from
this standpoint argue that social media users’ exploitation requires a low level of alienation (cf.
Fisher, 2012; Rey, 2012). By positing a trade-off between alienation and exploitation, they fail to
consider how alienation can be used to forge an analysis of social media that meets Smythe’s
materialist requirements. I conclude my article by making some suggestions for developing this
type of analysis.
Alienation in Marx and Beyond
The concept of alienation sits uneasily within the corpus of Marx’s work. Alienation features
strongly within his writings at a time when he was still working out the key tenets of his materialist
conception of history and his value theory-based analysis of capitalism more specifically. His
discussion of ‘estranged labour’ in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, for example, is
replete with references to alienation. For anyone who has even a passing familiarity with Structural
Marxism, alienation has weighty Althusserian baggage. Borrowing one of Gaston Bachelard’s
terms, Louis Althusser (1982, p. 34) identified an ‘epistemological break’ between the Manuscripts
and what Marx subsequently wrote, the lynchpin being his 1845 Theses on Feuerbach. Before that,
Marx’s work supposedly neither had ‘theoretical maturity’ nor was it truly ‘scientific’ (Althusser,
1982, p. 34).[1]
There is no doubt that the Theses are a watershed in Marx’s thinking. By bridging the subject–
object dualism through the notion of material praxis, Marx unshackles himself from mechanistic
materialism and abstract idealism alike (Marx, 1978 [1845]). But it is an overcall to assert, as
Althusser does, that there is a textual rupture between the Manuscripts and the Theses. Bertell
Ollman bends the stick too far in the opposite direction. In his pathbreaking Alienation (originally
published in 1971), he rejects all attempts to periodise Marx’s work along Althusserian lines,
whereby ‘each period [is] taken as a radical departure from what came before’ (Ollman, 1976, p.
xv). Far from being a pre-scientific conceptual remnant, alienation – Ollman argues – is the masterkey to Marx’s entire thinking.
Ernest Mandel takes a more even-handed approach. Shortly after Althusser’s For Marx was
originally published in French (as Pour Marx in 1965), Mandel came up with a scintillating – though
nowadays often neglected – little book on the genesis of Marx’s economic thinking (Mandel,
1971).[2] After addressing the place of the Manuscripts within the Marxian oeuvre and politically
contextualising the different interpretations of alienation’s status within Marx’s work, Mandel
arrives at the following conclusion:
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The evolution of Marx’s concept of alienated labour is thus clear: from an [ahistorical]
anthropological conception (Feuerbacho-Hegelian) before the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts, he advances towards a historical conception (starting with the German Ideology). The
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts constitute a transition from the first to the second[.]
(Mandel, 1971, p. 163)

Central to this transition, he maintains, was Marx’s ‘abandoning [of] the concept of the generic
man, the ‘‘species being’’’, which resulted in him finding ‘the precise historical roots of the
exploitation of man by man’ (Mandel, 1971, p. 162).
In his Manuscripts, Marx (1982 [1844], pp. 66-69) adumbrates four elements of alienation. The
first three are estrangement of workers from (1) each other, (2) their humanity (or ‘species-being’),
and (3) their subjectivity-realising activity in the labour process (‘self-estrangement’). The fourth
form of alienation is the ‘estrangement of the thing’ – namely, ‘the product of labour’ which
confronts the worker ‘as an alien object’ (Marx, 1982 [1844], pp. 66-67, original emphasis). The
philosophical notion of species-being was central to just one aspect of alienation that Marx
identified. Focusing on the other aspects, Mandel directs attention towards what he calls Marx’s
subsequent treatment of specifically ‘economic alienation’ (in the Grundrisse and Capital) due to the
‘social division of labor’ that splits capitalist societies into social classes (Mandel, 1971, p. 181,
emphasis omitted). According to Mandel, economic alienation is estrangement from labour’s
products, from the act of production in the labour process, including the ‘instruments of labor’ that
workers confront ‘as an alien and hostile power which enslaves and stifles’ them (Mandel, 1971,
p. 181).[3]
Neglect of economic alienation is precisely what Musto (2010, p. 86) takes Erich Fromm to
task for – namely, failing to assign ‘due weight to objective alienation (that of the worker in the
labour process and in relation to the labour product)’. Musto connects the dots between the French
existentialists, psychoanalysts like Fromm, and philosophers such as Herbert Marcuse, arguing that
they divorce alienation from history and specifically capitalist relations of production. He describes
as a ‘glaring error’ the existentialist preoccupation with ‘the concept of self-alienation’ or ‘the
alienation of the worker from the human species and from others like himself’ – at the expense of
objective (economic) alienation (Musto, 2010, pp. 87-88). Across the Atlantic the situation was even
worse. The conservative intellectual tide let alienation drift in the scholarly literature much farther
away from Marx’s original meaning of the term (Horowitz, 1996). Cold war-era North American
sociologists ‘generally saw alienation as a problem linked to the system of industrial production,
whether capitalist or socialist, and mainly affecting human consciousness’ (Musto, 2010, p. 94).
Establishment-type organisational sociologists such as Robert Blauner took the spotlight off
economic alienation within capitalism per se, claiming instead to illuminate alienation as the socialpsychological symptom of a Durkheimian-generic industrial society’s failings (Blauner, 1964).[4]
Ultimately sociologists allowed alienation conceptually to dwindle down to mere ‘individual
maladjustment to social norms’ (Musto, 2010, p. 94).
Interestingly, this normative (culturalist) emphasis has its counterpart in late-1960s – protestera – work by French social theorists who were most interested, not in homogenising notions of
industrialism or defending American values, but rather in understanding and critiquing capitalism’s
new forms. Musto (2010, pp. 90-92) identifies Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle (which came out
in 1967) and Jean Baudrillard’s Consumer Society (published in 1970) as key texts that hooked
alienation into the worker’s envelopment by the spectacular flashiness of a symbol-laden
consumerist social order. For Debord and Baudrillard alike, the capitalist economy is culturalised;
culture is ‘the star commodity of the spectacular society’ (Debord, 1983, p. 193). The worker qua
spectator is alienated by the insinuation of capitalism’s spectacular imagery into his/her
consciousness:
The alienation of the spectator to the profit of the contemplated object ... is expressed in the
following way: the more he contemplates the less he lives; the more he accepts recognizing
himself in the dominant images of need, the less he understands his own existence and his own
desires. The externality of the spectacle in relation to the active man appears in the fact that his
own gestures are no longer his but those of another who represents them to him.
(Debord, 1983, p. 30)

85

James Reveley
Alienation is at the heart of Debord’s analysis. Baudrillard refers to alienation just a handful of
times in his Consumer Society. As eagle-eyed Musto (2010, p. 91) points out, however, Baudrillard
concludes that the consumer society’s emergence has ushered in ‘the age of radical alienation’
(Baudrillard, 1999, p. 191). Even more striking is the emphasis Baudrillard places on inculcation of
cultural norms:
Consumption is an active, collective behaviour: it is something enforced, a morality, an
institution. It is a whole system of values, with all that expression implies in terms of group
integration and social control functions ... . The consumer society is also the society of learning
to consume, of social training in consumption. That is to say, there is a new and specific mode of
socialization related to the emergence of new productive forces and the monopoly restructuring
of a high-productivity economic system. (Baudrillard, 1999, p. 81, original emphasis)

What one finds, then, in Debord and this early work by Baudrillard is the intertwining of the
concept of alienation with a strikingly culturalist account of the consumer society’s reproduction,
which accents the ideational realm.
There are, however, glimmers of praxis-based materialism in Baudrillard’s writing. For one,
from the standpoint of reproducing the existing capitalist institutional order, he argues that mass
communications function not to inculcate normative values in individuals. Rather, his view of their
socially reproductive effect seems to echo Henri Lefebvre’s (1976) point that, with respect to
reproduction of the capitalist system, people’s practical experiences of mystified and fetishised
social relations are more important than ideologically infused socialisation processes. For
Baudrillard (1999, p. 123), television ‘conveys by its technical organization ... the idea (the ideology)
of a world endlessly visualizable, endlessly segmentable and readable in images’. Likewise, the
‘mass communication function’ of advertising rests not in advertisement content, but rather in ‘its
very logic as an autonomized medium ... referring not to real objects, not to a real world or a
referential dimension, but from one sign to the other, from one object to the other, from one
consumer to the other’ (Baudrillard, 1999, p. 125). Fast-forwarding to his 1983 text Simulations, one
finds Baudrillard has pushed these ideas until the pips squeak, writing of ‘the dissolution of TV into
life, the dissolution of life into TV’ (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 55). The medium ‘is now intangible,
diffuse and defracted in the real, and it can no longer even be said that the latter is distorted by it’
(Baudrillard, 1983, p. 54). The upshot is this: there has been a ‘fantastic telescoping’ of reality and
signification (p. 57), such that any and all distinction between reality and image blur, thereby
ushering in ‘absolute manipulation’ (p. 57) based on the ‘non-distinction of active and passive’
(p. 58, emphasis omitted). If so, then individuals are even more completely enveloped by
spectacular capitalism than they were through the socialisation process he wrote about in The
Consumer Society.
Far from Baudrillard’s proto-materialism providing a link back to objective (economic)
alienation, it detracts from this issue. The enduring image is of the individual immersed in a
consumer society that erases the distinction between image and object, as the image is objectified
and the object is spectacularised. It is an era of ‘absolute manipulation’, but one without any
apparent connection back to the social division of labour and to capital accumulation, as
production ‘becomes somehow abstract’ and exchanges its sign with art (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 151).
To summarise: accenting alienation’s subjective side (human essence, species being,
existential angst and the like), especially in combination with conceptions of society as a
consumerist social order (through the lens of circulation, that is), leads right away from the
materialist analysis of media that Smythe advocated. Indeed, in the following section I show that
this focus, carried over to the present day, characterises one whole cluster of critical
communications scholars who identify social media use as alienating. Though their reference point
is not Baudrillard but Gramsci, by pressing into service the latter’s notion of hegemony they depict
the cultural envelopment of the social media user in terms that rival Baudrillard’s treatment of the
individual’s plight within the consumer society.
Social Media User Alienation I: ideology and hegemony
The semblance of active participation in social media, the possibility of uploading materials or
commenting on existing ones, of sharing Facebook ‘likes’ with others, no doubt perpetuates the
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myth of consumer sovereignty. Social media users choose to do these things. It is this conscious
participation in a process that ultimately results in commodification of personal information
stripped from the user, and its reconfiguration for targeted advertising, which has led the authors I
review in this section to make the link from Marx’s concept of alienation to Gramscian-style
hegemony.
Proulx et al (2011, p. 23) are a case in point: based in large part on a Facebook case study, they
claim ‘the Internet is transforming ordinary users into active, consenting participants in their own
alienation by consumer society’. By alienation they mean submitting to a system that takes
something from users. Using Bruns’ (2008) now standard sociological parlance, and referring to
social media users as ‘produsers’, they argue that ‘[t]he act of creation and freedom that defines the
produser – freely producing, remixing, and distributing content on the web – is also an act of
subjection and submission to the economic system on which the Internet is based’ (Proulx et al,
2011, p. 22). What does this system take from users? The answer they supply: users’ information.
They state – correctly in my view – that:
personal information left on sites by users of Web 2.0 platforms ... eventually becomes metadata
that can be used for sophisticated profiling of Web clients. Profiles can then be sold or exchanged
between companies, producing increasingly precise targeting of advertising campaigns and
marketing strategies. (Proulx et al, 2011, p. 23)

To argue that this user-generated data, as opposed to consciously created and upload ‘usergenerated content’ (van Dijck, 2009, p. 41), is stripped away or ‘alienated’ from the social media
user is one thing. But it is quite another to say that users, therefore, are not just subjectively
alienated by a consumer society but consent to their alienation.
Proulx et al (2011) go not just one, but two steps too far. This is because their argument about
consent begs the following question: If social media use is subjectively alienating, why do people
participate in a system that alienates them? Their explanation, along with that of the other scholars
I discuss in this section, grafts the Gramscian notion of hegemony onto a strong socialisation
(consumer culturalist) model of the relationship between the individual and society. Proulx et al
(2011, p. 23) say that Facebook providing produsers with the ability to protest about Facebook’s
own corporate actions enables them (the produsers) to ‘participate in Gramsci’s counter hegemonic
project’. Facebook may facilitate protest, but clearly it sees social media as hegemonic in the first
instance – to the extent that it reproduces consumer capitalism. Likewise, Bernard Stiegler
implicates YouTube in
a major turn in the cultural hegemony and the poisonous heteronomy imposed by the
consumerist industrialization of culture ... [A]s anticipated by Antonio Gramsci, the cultural
hegemony of consumerism consists of imposing heteronomy, while making believe that political
decisions are no longer possible – ‘there is no alternative’ – because politics has been absorbed by
the market and the economy. (Stiegler, 2009, p. 47, original emphasis)

Comor (2010), too, presses Gramsci into service. Because he advances one of the more welldeveloped arguments, it is worth looking closely at his reasoning. He maintains that social media
users, amongst others whom he calls ‘prosumers’, are all trapped in ‘a hegemonic order’ (Comor,
2010, p. 323). Here is why: ‘the prosumer acts in response to his state of alienation ... [but] the act of
prosumption itself may deepen this state of being’ (p. 321). Comor invokes the liberal sociologist
Zygmunt Bauman on the ‘consumerist culture’ to argue that the social media user qua prosumer is
‘promoting and selling himself to others as yet another commodity’ (p. 320). Quite which market
this sale is transacted through is unclear. Comor is persistent though, arguing that ‘becoming
known to others’ is users’ ‘idealized’ goal (p. 320). Indeed, in an ‘alienated polity’, supposedly the
only way to participate is to seek ‘to be included in a cultural tapestry of exchangeable
commodities’ (p. 320). Notably, this includes ‘attracting Facebook friends’ (p. 320). Culture implies
inculcation of norms and values, including wrong notions ‘self-empowerment’ which in reality,
Comor maintains, are founded on ‘commodifying social relations’ (p. 322), such that users
‘internalize mostly commodified constructs’ (p. 323). Culture, inclusion, and internalisation --clearly Comor is making a strong socialisation argument.
Analysing social media in terms of cultural hegemony leads to the worst of both worlds of
social theory. Writing about factory labour, Burawoy (2012) pinpoints these twin faults; what he
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says is equally applicable to digital labour. First, by making ‘claims about the deep internalization of
social structure, reminiscent of the structural functionalism of the 1950s and its “oversocialized
man”’, Comor and others ‘compound the forcefulness and eternalization of the present’ (Burawoy,
2012, pp. 204-205). How does anyone ever consciously rupture the capitalist cultural membrane if
in everything they do, including organising a protest by communicating with Facebook friends,
they are automatically and unambiguously ‘reproducing ... their own possessive individualism and
alienation’ (Comor, 2010, p. 322)? This is political nihilism writ large; it forgets the first lesson about
the ever-present possibility of resistance. For one, political organising skills can be learnt through
web usage. Facebook itself provides a platform for organising efforts, as protesters’ online activities
during the 2011 Egyptian revolution amply demonstrate (Ghonim, 2012).
The second point of criticism is that the socialisation-plus-hegemony approach reproduces
analytic failings inherent to Gramsci who, Burawoy (2012, p. 203) argues, ‘does not recognize the
mystification of exploitation upon which hegemony, that is consent to domination, rests’.[5] In
other words, by appealing to Gramsci, they (Comor; Stiegler; Proulx et al) theoretically foreclose
on understanding social media’s role within the capitalist circuit. Their analysis ends with the user’s
incorporation into a hegemonic order. The Gramscian theorists of social media, in effect, subscribe
to the Weberian notion of capitalism as a cultural system propounded by contemporary economic
historians such as Appleby (2010). The corollary is that capitalist entrepreneurs – rather than
workers – are the key value creators; that capitalists too are hoodwinking ‘captains of
consciousness’ (Ewen, 2001). This is in fact a step backwards from the later (post-Consumer Society)
Baudrillard. My point is this: the perpetuation of capitalist societies has more to do with the daily
lived experience of a society in which appearance masks essence than it does with ideas culturally
imported into people’s minds by socialising them into a set of pro-capitalist cultural values.[6]
The turn to Gramsci prevents scholars from using the idea of economic alienation to consider
fully, from the standpoint of the capitalist integration, the effects of social media stripping away
user-generated data. Put in the terms of this article’s opening statement, it sidetracks them from
considering ‘what economic function for capital’ social media serves, and analysing its ‘role in the
reproduction of capitalist relations of production’.
Social Media User Alienation II: the switch
The second critical social media school of thought’s protagonists --- notably, Rey (2012) and Fisher
(2012) --- flip the switch: engaging with social media, they insist, militates against alienation.
Ostensibly working within a materialist framework, Fisher argues that social media users are ‘dealienated’ under a deliberate capitalist strategy to heighten the rate of exploitation (Fisher, 2012,
p. 179). Fisher does not cite Rey; their work was published contemporaneously. Nonetheless,
Fisher’s work can be read as taking to its logical conclusion Rey’s insistence that ‘social media is
characterized by exploitation in the (relative) absence of alienation’ (Rey, 2012, p. 416). The
implication is clear: there is neither a necessary nor a logical connection between alienation and
exploitation, as one can be low and the other high.[7] Rey suggests there is a trade-off between
alienation and exploitation to the benefit of capitalism as a whole, to wit ‘the structural conditions
of the digital economy link profitability to a reduction in the intensity of alienation’ (Rey, 2012,
p. 399). Fisher goes one step further and posits a ‘dialectical link between exploitation and
alienation’ (Fisher, 2012, p. 179).[8] What each author is saying, in essence, is that by reducing
people’s alienation, social media is functional for capitalism to the extent that it lifts the rate of
exploitation. Fisher expresses this idea in terms of a quid pro quo:
the relations of production entailed by social media are based on an implicit social contract which
allows media companies to commodify the communication produced by users (i.e. exploiting
them) in return for giving them control over the process of producing communication, and
expanding their opportunity for de-alienation. (Fisher, 2012, p. 180)

This rupturing of the direct Marxian connection between alienation and exploitation, transmuting
each into a dimension that can move oppositely, has little to do with assessing alienation’s
applicability to social media. Rather, Rey and Fisher’s primary reason for conceptually hiving off
alienation from exploitation is so they can reconcile voluntary participation in social media with
their assertion that users are unrelentingly exploited. According to Rey (2012, p. 416), ‘the social
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media user is exploited nonstop’. Fisher (2012, p. 179) talks of ‘the extension and intensification of
exploitation in social media compared with mass media’. Any Marxist worth their salt would
straightaway ask: why do social media users tolerate this heightened exploitation, especially when
it is uncompensated for by living standards increases (i.e. increased real wages)? The answer is that
‘[s]uch exploitation ... is conditioned by a promise for de-alienation’ (Fisher, 2012, 179). Mining the
same vein, Rey (2012, p. 416) suggests that ‘social media provides evidence that people are rather
tolerant of exploitation so long as whatever activity they are involved in is not particularly
alienating’.
Arguing that increasing exploitation is based on the prospect of reducing alienation has a
certain intuitive appeal, but ultimately I think it is spurious. The main problem stems from insisting
that social media users are exploited in the first place, and then positing a trade-off between
exploitation and alienation in order to ‘prove’ this point. Rey and Fisher derive their proposition
about social media user exploitation by fusing an updated version of Smythe’s (1977) audience
exploitation idea with autonomist notions of immaterial labour, and of exploitation occurring
throughout every level of society (Hardt & Negri, 2009). Building on this idea, Fuchs (2010) even
asserts that Internet users are infinitely exploited. Rey does not accept that exploitation is infinite,
but both he and Fisher draw on a form of audience exploitation reasoning as the basis for saying
that social media users are exploited in the first place. There are subtle differences between their
arguments, so I will look at each in turn.
According to Rey (2012, p. 416), social media users (like other Net users) ‘produce
information commodities [in] virtually every waking second’. For him, this is the key to nonstop
exploitation. But his bundling of social media in with generalised arguments about exploitation on
the web is problematical. For one, the most valuable information commodities for social media
firms are derived from users’ involuntarily and unknowingly ceded personal data – that is, from
user-generated data, as distinct from user-generated content (van Dijck, 2009). Here is the crucial
point: the creators and sellers of the information commodities fashioned from this user-generated
data are not the social media users themselves, but rather the Internet firms that capture this data in
the first place. These firms mine and store users’ search histories in order to construct a web user
profile which is then used to personalise advertising, by producing customised advertising that
targets individual users’ preferences. This Internet marketing technique – so-called contextual
advertising – is the lifeblood of Google (YouTube’s owner), whose ‘real customers’ are not its
everyday users but rather advertisers (Vaidhyanathan, 2011, p. 26). As George Ritzer and his
colleagues point out:
In the main, people do not pay for Google products (e.g., Gmail, Google maps). Rather, Google’s
profits come from selling information on its users to advertisers[.] (Ritzer et al, 2012, p. 387)

By means of a cleverly constructed auction arrangement, having first siphoned off user-generated
data, Google then sells it at a profit. Siva Vaidhyanathan explains how:
[Google] collects the gigabytes of personal information ... that millions of Google users provide
for free to the Web every day and sells this information to advertisers of millions of products and
services. Through its major advertising program, AdWords, Google runs an instant auction
among advertisers to determine which one is placed highest on the list of ads that run across the
top or down the right-hand column of the search results page. (Vaidhyanathan, 2011, p. 26)

Facebook’s main source of revenue is also advertising.[9] Like Google, its business model is based
on ‘using our profiles to present us with advertisements’ on subjects we have flagged an interest in
(Vaidhyanathan, 2011, p. 83).
To recapitulate, it is not the social media users who transform their own personal data into an
information commodity; nor do they sell these data on any sort of market. Instead, they are
siphoned off by Internet firms, transformed by them, and sold to advertisers. Without involving the
social media users in any sort of market relation, wage relation, or indeed any market-based
transaction at all – other than purchasing access to the web from an Internet service provider – it is
difficult to see how exploitation in the original Marxian meaning of the term arises. This calls into
question Rey’s use of alienation as a conceptual stepping stone to his social-media-user-exploitation
argument.
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Fisher’s insistence that social media users are exploited relies on resurrecting Smythe’s (1977,
p. 6) idea that the mass media audience is a commodity whose time ‘is bought and used in the
marketing of the advertiser’s product’. The corollary is Smythe’s notion of ‘surplus value created
by people working in audiences’ (Smythe, 1977, p. 19). For Fisher, social media users are not
merely implicated in the production of information commodities that are on-sold by firms like
Google; rather, the users are the commodity: ‘the audience in SNS [social network sites] is a
commodity (sold to advertisers)’ (Fisher 2012, p. 181). Contra the studies reviewed in the previous
section, Fisher insists that social media provides ‘the opportunity for authentic self-expression’
(Fisher, 2012, p. 182). Moreover, users are supposedly remunerated by social media firms
themselves: ‘the [social media] platform (‘wages’) is exchanged for the audience work of
communicating and socializing (‘labour’)’ (Fisher, 2012, p. 181). Channelling Jhally and Livant
(1986), Fisher thus makes explicit what is implicit within Smythe’s audience commodity thesis –
namely, that television ‘programming ... is the wage of the audience’ (Jhally & Livant, 1986, p. 136).
This wrongheaded idea assumes that ‘audiences sell watching-power to media owners’ (Jhally &
Livant, 1986, p. 135), and that television programmes are the reward (the wage-equivalent) they
receive in return. Jhally and Livant’s argument breaks down logically when they say that
programmes are not just wages, they ‘are messages that have to be “sold” to consumers – they are
in fact consumer goods’ (Jhally & Livant, 1986, p. 142, emphasis omitted). What this means is that
so-called audience ‘workers’ are sold their own wages. This exercise in illogicality demonstrates the
perils of argument by analogy – in this case, likening television watching to industrial production
conceptualised in Marxian terms.
Fisher experiences similar problems when he extends Jhally and Livant’s (1986) argument
from mass media to social media. His assertion, that when people use social media they are
somehow ‘working’ and receiving a wage-like payment in kind, implies they are selling something.
Yet it is users’ personal data and not users themselves, nor their attention and communication
online, which constitute the prized informational commodity social media firms sell to advertisers.
Fisher’s recourse to the ‘implicit contract’ idea does not get him out this conundrum. As parties to
a ‘social contract’ (Fisher’s term) of which they are unaware, social media users receive a wage
which they do not conceive of as such, in a process of unconscious self-commodification. As
Caraway (2011, p. 699) points out, the whole audience commodity idea ‘robs the audience of
subjectivity’.[10] Moreover, as workers qua social media users neither demand these ‘wages’ nor
struggle to increase them, they appear merely as a gift – suggesting that capitalists are beneficent
individuals. This reverses the proper Marxian polarity: capital accumulation is capitalism’s sine qua
non, so the unpaid time users spend online is best construed as ‘free gifts’ they unwittingly cede to
capitalist firms (Smith, 2010, p. 209). This time should not be seen as the social media firm’s gift to
social media users.
I will now draw this part of my article to a close. Work by scholars who say that social media
reduces users’ levels of alienation starkly contrasts with the Gramscian-inflected studies I reviewed
in the previous section, which argued that social media alienates users by subsuming them within a
consumerist culture. There is nonetheless one point of similarity between the culturalist social
media alienation studies and the proponents of the de-alienation thesis. It is this: equating social
media’s usefulness (use value, in Rey’s terms) with reduced alienation simply to explain why users
tolerate nonstop exploitation results in emphasis on subjective aspects of alienation (personal selfexpression, for example) at objective alienation’s expense.
In short, how Fisher (2012) and Rey (2012) construct their argument has considerable
drawbacks. By being too loose in their use of ‘exploitation’, they constantly risk rendering this
concept so diffuse that it becomes almost literally meaningless. Likewise, their reduction of
alienation to its subjective elements – in the service of their exploitation thesis – obscures the
insights into social media’s capitalist function that a focus on economic alienation affords.
Concluding Discussion
Applying economic alienation to social media entails focusing on alienation’s objective dimensions
rooted in the social division of labour --- in essence, private ownership of social media firms, the
dependence of those firms on advertising, the specific form of advertising used, and advertising’s
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role in fostering workers’ consumption demand. I round out my discussion by addressing each of
these points in turn, blending insights from Smythe (1977) and from Andrejevic’s (2011) recent
work on social media.[11]
Returning to Marx’s original definition of alienation, the idea most obviously applicable to
social media is ‘estrangement of the thing’, which confronts the worker ‘as an alien object’ (Marx,
1982 [1844], pp. 66-67, original emphasis). Along these lines, Andrejevic (2011, p. 286) argues that
the generation of user-generated data, and especially its use to create contextualised (user-targeted)
advertisements, ‘is an activity that returns to users in an unrecognizable form as a means of
fulfilling the imperatives of others’. Within the critical communications literature, this most closely
resembles Marx’s classical ‘alien objects’ idea. But Andrejevic goes off-track, adding the
supplementary concept of surveillance to identify an additional oppressive process atop alienation
which occurs through Internet advertising. Andrejevic’s application of Marx has merit; his couplet
‘exploitation-as-alienation’ (Andrejevic’s, 2011, p. 284), and the idea of alienation as being
compounded by surveillance, do not. Certainly social media can facilitate state surveillance of
users, as the case of government authorities hacking Tunisians’ Facebook accounts during the
political uprising graphically shows (Fenton, 2012, p. 155). But conflating exploitation with
alienation, while simultaneously adding surveillance to the theoretical mix, just muddies the waters
(cf. Andrejevic, 2012).
Instead of pressing surveillance (whether Foucauldian or otherwise) into service, with regard
to social media, I suggest that Andrejevic’s point about targeted advertising be read back through
Smythe’s pathbreaking Marxist analysis of advertising.[12] As Fuchs (2012, p. 52) notes, social
media firms rely heavily on advertising for their revenue. Yet because the whole Smythian
audience commodity idea is inherently problematical (Caraway, 2011), it cannot be
straightforwardly transplanted from mass media to social media. Rather, I take two different
insights from Smythe’s work.
First, Smythe talks of mass media advertising exposing audience members to ‘alienation from
the commodities-in-general which they participate in marketing to themselves’ (Smythe, 1977,
p. 20). Social media users are objectively alienated in the sense that they are implicated in a system
of advertising that is functional for the reproduction of capitalism. This connects directly to the
second point I take from Smythe. He argued that advertising undergirds worker demand for
consumer goods; thus it can function to avert a crisis of underconsumption by fulfilling a ‘demand
management’ role (Smythe, 1977, p. 19). This can help ameliorate an inbuilt capitalist crisis
propensity: keeping real wages down on the one hand helps the production of surplus value, but on
the other, it inhibits the realisation of surplus value due to insufficient worker-derived consumption
demand. In point of fact, as David Harvey shows, just such a thing was happening in the United
States due to ‘wage repression’ around the time Smythe advanced his thesis about demand
management through advertising (Harvey, 2010, pp. 12-16). He states that ‘impoverished workers
do not constitute a vibrant market’ (Harvey, 2010, p. 16). This has serious implications, as ‘a crisis
of “underconsumption” results when there is not enough effective demand to absorb the
commodities produced’ (Harvey, 2010, p. 107). To the extent that it stimulates working-class
consumption demand, especially when supported by workers’ access to cheap finance, advertising
can play a role in averting or minimising such a crisis (Harvey, 2010, pp. 106-107).[13] The global
financial crisis is not yet over and further research is needed to assess the role of social media-based
advertising, in particular, in shoring up working-class consumption demand. Instead of targeting
the domain of consumerist ideology, or metaphorically displacing exploitation from production to
circulation, materialist analysis of social media is better served by connecting online advertising
with contemporary underconsumptionist theories (Desai, 2010).
To conclude: authors who assert that social media users are culturally duped and/or
exploited impede understanding of social media’s role within the capitalist circuit. Using the
concept of economic alienation to grasp this role has two benefits. First, it is consonant with the
materialist form of analysis that Smythe (1977) advocated. Second, it allows exploitation to be
terminologically restricted to the specifically capitalist form of value-transfer that originates within
the labour process. It is precisely this concern to which one of the most insightful Marxist analysts
of the global financial crisis, Costas Lapavitsas, was responding when he coined the term ‘financial
expropriation’ to distinguish financialisation from ‘exploitation at the point of production’
(Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 131). By the same token, it is interesting that no lesser theorists than the
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autonomists Michael Hardt and Toni Negri themselves have recently cautioned against using the
subjective sense of ‘alienation’ to describe the effects of web-based interaction; they substitute the
term ‘mediatized’ for that of the ‘alienated subject’ (Hardt & Negri, 2012, p. 14). This is more than
merely a matter of semantics. The task is to find the appropriate conceptual vocabulary with which
to understand the blend of expressive and oppressive effects of the web in general and social media
in particular, while keeping in sight the dynamics of digital capitalism. Hopefully this article has
gone some way towards that end.
Notes
[1] Tellingly, Althusser (1982, p. 239, emphasis omitted) refers to ‘the pre-Marxist ideological concept of
alienation’.
[2] The book, Mandel’s Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, was first published in French in
1967. An English edition came out in 1971. On Mandel’s strident critique of Althusser’s ideas, see
Stutje (2009, pp. 127-129).
[3] Contra Althusser, Mandel (1971, p. 177) argues: ‘Not only is the concept of alienation not “preMarxist,” it forms part of the instrumentariam used by Marx when he had arrived at full maturity.
When reading Capital with attention, one comes upon it there as well, though sometimes in a
slightly modified form.’
[4] Blauner (1964, p. 3) wholeheartedly accepts the view ‘that alienation is not a consequence of
capitalism per se but of employment in large-scale organizations and impersonal bureaucracies that
pervade all industrial societies’.
[5] ‘Gramsci believed that workers actively, deliberately and consciously collaborate in the reproduction
of capitalism; they consent to a domination defined as hegemony. They understand what they are
doing; they simply have difficulty appreciating that there could be anything beyond capitalism.
Domination was not mystified but naturalized, eternalized’ (Burawoy, 2012, p. 203).
[6] This is shown by Steven (1983) with reference to advanced industrial capitalism in Japan.
[7] Rey (2012, p. 416) in fact argues ‘that exploitation is not a sufficient condition for alienation and
alienation is not a necessary condition for exploitation’.
[8] Fisher (2012, p. 179) also explicitly uses the trade-off metaphor.
[9] See the eMarketer figures at
http://www.medianewsline.com/news/168/ARTICLE/9651/2012-09-03.html
[10] Furthermore, Caraway (2011, p. 697) insightfully observes that in Smythe’s (1977) original discussion,
‘[t]he actual transaction is between the media owner and the advertiser’; the net result is that the
audience commodity’s owner – the audience itself – ‘is not party to the transaction’. He therefore
concludes that ‘Smythe’s transaction more closely resembles a plantation owner haggling with slave
traders’ (Caraway, 2011, p. 697). Indeed, Fisher’s recourse to implicit contracting is reminiscent of
how establishment-type economic historians use this concept to discuss slavery (e.g. see Findlay,
1975).
[11] Earlier I criticised Andrejevic (2009). The shift in tone and substance between Andrejevic (2009) and
Andrejevic (2011) shows some refinement, at least, in this author’s attempt to apply Marxian
concepts to social media.
[12] Andrejevic does not draw from Foucault, instead using the term surveillance in its everyday sense.
For the limitations of the panopticon as a model for Net-based control, see Vaidhyanathan (2011,
pp. 111-112).
[13] Of course, as Harvey (2010) shows, a financial crisis can result from unregulated lending that
artificially boosts workers’ buying power.
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